Other Books
Free Will and Action Explanation (Oxford University Press, 2016)
Description
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. When a person acts, or does something on purpose, we explain the behavior by citing the agent's reasons. The dominant view in philosophy of mind has been to construe such explanations as a species of causal explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleological rather than causal. Part II applies the teleological account of action to free will and responsibility, arguing that the free actions--the ones for which we are directly responsible--are the goal-directed actions, the actions that are teleologically explicable in terms of our reasons. It is then argued that this non-causal account of action undermines the appeal of incompatibilist arguments, arguments attempting to show that free will is not compatible with determinism. Beyond this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works well in practice: it is in accord with our clear intuitions about cases, and it both explains and provides guidance in the cases where our intuitions are murkier.
Reviews
"Scott Sehon's ambitious account of his teleological approach to action explanation, free will, and moral responsibility is very well written, cogent, and engaging. Furthermore, while this is certainly a book aimed squarely at an academic audience, it is one likely to draw the attention of scholars from a range of disciplines. As well as philosophers concerned with debates surrounding free will and compatibilism, Free Will and Action Explanation is also likely to be of interest to those working in the fields of psychology and cognitive science."
— Peter J. Josse, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
"It is an ambitious book, full of original and often compelling arguments."
— Derek Baker, Australasian Journal of Philosophy
"The book is wonderfully written, meticulously organized, carefully argued, richly informed by the relevant work of others, and philosophically rigorous. Part I is a sustained defense of teleology and criticism of causalism. Part II carves out a new position among compatibilist contenders."
— Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online
"A well-written, engaging theory of agency, free will, and moral responsibility...In this book, Sehon makes substantial contributions to the contemporary debate over the compatibility of free will and determinism...Sehon's theory is one of the more original and promising compatibilist theories, and his arguments are clear, interesting, and well worth review for those interested in and familiar with the contemporary free will debate."
— Metapsychology Online Reviews
Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation (MIT Press, 2005)
Description
Using the language of common-sense psychology (CSP), we explain human behavior by citing its reason or purpose, and this is central to our understanding of human beings as agents. On the other hand, since human beings are physical objects, human behavior should also be explicable in the language of physical science, in which causal accounts cast human beings as collections of physical particles. CSP talk of mind and agency, however, does not seem to mesh well with the language of physical science. In Teleological Realism, Scott Sehon argues that CSP explanations are not causal but teleological—that they cite the purpose or goal of the behavior in question rather than an antecedent state that caused the behavior. CSP explanations of behavior, Sehon claims, are answering a question different from that answered by physical science explanations, and, accordingly, CSP explanations and physical science explanations are independent of one another. Common-sense facts about mind and agency can thus be independent of the physical facts about human beings, and, contrary to the views of most philosophers of mind in recent decades, common-sense psychology will not be subsumed by physical science. Sehon defends his non-reductionist account of mind and agency in clear and nontechnical language. He carefully distinguishes his view from forms of "strong naturalism" that would seem to preclude it. And he evaluates key objections to teleological realism, including those posed by Donald Davidson's influential article "Actions, Reasons and Causes" and some put forth by more recent proponents of causal theories of action. CSP, Sehon argues, has a different realm than does physical science; the normative notions that are central to CSP are not reducible to physical facts and laws.
Reviews
" For over forty years, the orthodox view in the philosophy of mind has been that common-sense psychological explanations of human actions are causal explanations. In his lucid and elegant monograph, Scott Sehon challenges this orthodoxy. Sehon develops a detailed and original argument against the main assumptions of the causal view and outlines his own 'teleological realist' alternative. This is one of the strongest recent defenses of the non-causal view, and it deserves to be taken seriously by all philosophers of mind and action. In addition to being a new and first-rate piece of philosophical research, Sehon's book is so clearly written that it can be fruitfully used as a graduate or upper-level undergraduate text."
— Tim Crane, Department of Philosophy, University College London
“Since Davidson published 'Action, Reasons, and Causes, ' the view that common-sense psychological explanations are causal explanations has become nearly a dogma in the philosophy of mind and action. "Teleological Realism" mounts an impressive case against this dogma, showing that the causalist accounts are far from adequate. Sehon suggests that we replace causalism with teleological realism, the view that common-sense psychological explanations explain solely by citing the purpose of the action. In doing so he makes a compelling case for a view that has been all but overlooked in the philosophical literature. This is doubtless a first-rate book and required reading for all philosophers working in this area. But Sehon also writes in a clear and engaging style that makes Teleological Realism accessible to anyone interested in the topic."
— Sergio Tenenbaum, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
“The writing is engaging and lucid and the argument is intelligent, extremely interesting, and in significant part original… I think this book is excellent and I recommend it to anyone interested in the topic of teleological explanation of action.”
— Carl Ginet, Department of Philosophy, Cornell University